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THESIS BOOKLET

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**Restrictions on fundamental rights in military counter-intelligence
and military intelligence activities**
for his doctoral thesis (PhD)

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Presentation of the research topic, justification of its relevance

Security is a product that the state, by its very nature, is obliged to produce for its citizens. It guarantees this in its economic, social, physical, infocommunication and other aspects through institutionalised organisational systems. On a large scale, similar organisations with similar functions have been set up in all countries of the world to carry out this state function, with differences arising merely from different historical roots, status in the international community or even specific features of the social order.

Some organisations set up to guarantee security have several core functions in the field and concentrate their resources on purely professional, core tasks, which means that they are not able to guarantee the security of the State and its citizens in a complex manner, covering the whole spectrum of the field, especially in the case of hidden or covert attacks that may be considered specific.

The timely detection of these covert or covert activities, which are a threat to security, by their very nature require the use of a specific system of means and methods, necessarily involving specific measures which are deeply restrictive of human rights, and for which the national security services are empowered, among others. With this mandate, the national security services ensure the functioning of the State free from threats or, in other words, from influence, which is also the value that determines the purpose of the existence of these organisations and the legal basis for their activities. It is important to stress that it is not possible for a State or non-State actor that is exposed to a threat to operate free of influence, as this exerts an external influence on the organisation which also affects several aspects of its activities.

The existence of national security organisations, their powers and even their budgets, leaders and headquarters are public data¹, but the essence and specific content of their activities are usually classified data due to the nature of the threat to be detected and averted, as the disclosure of such data would in itself jeopardise the success of their activities and ultimately the security of citizens. However, this secrecy and the restriction of the fundamental rights of citizens can only be allowed, within a democratic framework, if it is necessary to protect another fundamental right or constitutional value, and only within a strictly defined legal framework, with constitutional guarantees and respect for fundamental rights.

¹ In general, this is true for democratic states, but in the Russian Federation, for example, the above data are also public.

While in the past, the activities of the national security services were discussed only among friends and society did not have up-to-date information not only about their existence and regulation, but also about historical events in the world, today's infocommunication possibilities provide everyone with the opportunity to express their views in public, especially the younger generations, in addition to immediate access. In this way, there is a growing focus on the extent to which the state intervenes in the lives of citizens, and does so in a legitimate and justified manner, but also in a way that is proportionate to the objective pursued: security.

Because of this greater publicity, human generational theories also had to be taken into account in the analysis of this topic. They show that the older generations were socialised in times of world crises - world wars, the Cold War - and that it was natural for them to be restricted in their rights, and that they did not speak out against this, while the younger generations only encountered crises - of an economic nature - that did not threaten their security, and that therefore the justification for the national security services or the army was often incomprehensible to them. This view of the world has of course been nuanced by highly publicised acts of terrorism or local crises below the level of war, but these have not had a profound effect on the younger generation, who are more inclined to question the social order.

For the above reasons, the topic covers an extremely broad spectrum of law, police, military science and other social sciences, which would have extended beyond the physical scope of the thesis by examining the entire national security system, so in order to maintain the military-scientific character of the thesis, it was justified to narrow it down to military counterintelligence and military intelligence in the domestic context. The research did not aim at a comprehensive legal analysis of the subject, but a sufficiently in-depth analysis of the relevant provisions was inevitable, as was a professional analysis of some basic concepts and the general human rights clause in order to make sense of the different system of relations resulting from generational differences.

With regard to the fundamental (human) rights as defined by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Fundamental Law of Hungary, as well as other relevant legislation and instruments regulating organisations, there is no consolidated document that would at least provide guidance to the (state) organisation authorised to carry out these activities, and that would examine the actual extent to which the collection of information in secret is restrictive.

There is also a lack of generational research on the national security sphere and its instruments, which would explain the relationship of different generations of people to the fundamental right to national security restrictions.

The findings of the research can also be used in the application of covert information gathering and covert means in the interests of national security, crime prevention, crime detection and law enforcement, while approaching the topic from the side of military intelligence and military intelligence activities, since the recent Hungarian legislation has harmonised the essential content of the use of means and methods under the Act on National Security Services and the Act on Criminal Proceedings.

Among the institutions established by the state, those with special powers to protect national security interests are known as secret services, or national security services. There is no complete consensus on the designation, either in law or in the profession. In the context of this thesis, I have used both the terms national security service and secret service in accordance with Hungarian law and literature.

Within the national security services, the division of national security activity is classically based on operational area (civilian and military) and functionally, on the activity side (intelligence and counter-intelligence). The emergence of both divisions is linked to the differentiation of the State's operational mechanisms and the separation required by professional and technological developments. The field of study of this thesis is the human rights that are limited in the exercise and protection of the national security interest, which is the responsibility of military intelligence and military counterintelligence under this division.

By its very nature, national security activities involve restrictions on fundamental rights. The services are generally established to obtain information and to counter threats that other institutions, with their limited operational framework and limited powers, are unable to carry out. The essential characteristic of the information to be obtained and the threats to be averted falling within the remit of the national security services is, in the first case, their limited availability and, in the second, their covert nature, which means that they require the use of a system of tools and methods to detect them, which in many cases lead to the disclosure of the content of interpersonal communications or involve influencing the identity of the secret holder.

This gives the services special powers that would be unthinkable for any other organisation under the rule of law. It is therefore a natural requirement of society that, given these powers, the service should use them only in cases which are proportionate to the value or interest it is defending. In the course of this thesis, I have examined in detail the fundamental requirement that a fundamental right may be restricted only for the purpose of protecting another fundamental right or national value (interest).

Historically, there has been a trend from closed-loop to open-loop regulation, both domestically and internationally. The activities of the state security services were mostly governed by classified legislation and public law instruments, even when the rules of conspiracy did not require it, or more precisely, everything that could be closed was closed (with the exception of the rules provided for by the Constitution, which could be derived from international law). The approach was therefore to keep everything hidden from the public that was not justified to be public. The current rules are more open, however, since the principle is now that information must be justified as being kept from the public, which implies that only the specific operational tasks and procedures constitute classified information, the means and methods to be used being open because of the requirement of predictability.

The scientific problem

After reviewing the above ideas and the relevant literature, I formulated the following research questions: to what extent do the tools and methods used in military counterintelligence and military intelligence activities restrict certain fundamental rights, can this difference be detected from the activities of civilian national security services, and to what extent does the perception of the use of intelligence tools depend on generational differences?

Hypotheses

H1. The equipment and methods used in military counter-intelligence and military intelligence are similar as in civilian intelligence, but the diverse operating environment means that fundamental rights are restricted in different depth and quantity.

H2. The tools and methods used in intelligence include the depth of the restriction on fundamental rights, whose practical application satisfies the legal requirement of necessity.

H3. Limitations of rights introduced in covert intelligence activities are perceived differently by different generations, and are less and less accepted by younger people.

Research objective

To establish quantitative and qualitative indicators of the restriction of fundamental rights as a result of the use of instruments and methods of military counter-intelligence and military intelligence, summarising them in the form of a table, and to establish a hierarchy between the instruments and methods, presenting them in a form that can be used by practitioners. To identify the specificities of the measures that can be introduced in military counter-intelligence and military intelligence activities in relation to civilian life, in terms of qualitative and quantitative indicators of the restrictions on fundamental rights, and the differences that can be identified in relation to these restrictions for each human generation.

Research methods

The thesis used a deductive research strategy. The reason for this is that the theory of national security is based on law, police and military science, and it is by analysing and synthesising the results of these disciplines that we can arrive at partial knowledge on the subject under study. The need to apply this research strategy is also underlined by the fact that the closed nature of the national security sector, primarily because of the preponderance of classified data, does not allow for an analysis based on practical experience. The aim of this thesis was to provide a practical guide to determine which elements of the covert intelligence tools and methods can be applied in a given situation in accordance with the legal requirements, and in particular the necessity requirement. On this basis, the research can be considered as applied research.

In the course of the research, the relevant domestic and foreign legal environment and relevant literature were reviewed, and the results and tools of related disciplines and fields were used.

In the course of the research, all aspects relevant and assessable in this field have been presented by applying the tools of jurisprudence (grammatical interpretation, taxonomic interpretation, teleological interpretation, interpretation according to the legislator's intention). The thesis is not a jurisprudential one, but the choice of subject matter made it impossible to avoid such an analysis.

The study from the military and police science side mainly used the tools of theoretical-logical research, which used the method of analysis and comparison to identify the interrelationships and the specificities of the subfields. This was the preferred method for this thesis because of the wide range of literature available.

Research summary

In the introductory section - the first six unnumbered subsections - I presented the rationale for the choice of topic, the methodological issues of the research and the relevant literature. I have also outlined the lines of research that have been the subject of little or no scholarly investigation, whose research will contribute to the understanding of the complex system of national security and whose analysis could be expected to yield new results.

In Chapter 1, I explored the origins and state-theoretical issues of the broad fundamental rights limiting powers of the national security services, the major events in the history of the services relevant to my research in an international context, and the landmark legislative changes that followed. I have also analysed the relationship between military national security activities and military science, as well as the social science issues that may have an impact on the operational activities and the replenishment of the personnel of these organisations as human generations evolve.

In Chapter 2, I reviewed the fundamental rights, their threefold division according to their restrictibility and explored, through the case law, the internationally accepted ways of restricting rights within the framework of the rule of law. I have analysed the functions of the counter-intelligence and intelligence branches, which form the core of national security operations, their respective boundaries, the limitation of rights within each function and the general issues of the interests of other states.

In Chapter 3, I reviewed the content and specifics of the restrictions on fundamental rights by analysing the open literature on military counterintelligence and military intelligence. I have also analysed the areas in which the two branches operate and the specific characteristics resulting from their organisational arrangements, on the basis of which I have drawn conclusions regarding their links with the civilian domain.

In Chapter 4, I explored the methods used by the national security services to obtain data other than secret information and their fundamental rights limitations. I have analysed the key regulatory issues for each method of data collection and compared them in terms of the depth of their fundamental rights limitations.

In Chapter 5, I analysed the fundamental rights-limiting aspects of the unauthorised and authorised covert information gathering tools and methods used by national security services, while highlighting the primary principles and professional minima that should be emphasised when introducing such tools and methods.

In Chapter 6, I analysed the different generations of people and their relationship to the administrative actors, based on the characteristics of the national security services and their relevance to the state, and explored both the fundamental rights restrictions imposed by the state and the psychological issues related to the personnel of the secret services. In addition to delineating police science and policing, I have analysed their relationship with national security-related science and practice, and explored the parallels and divergences between regulation and procedure.

Summary of conclusions

The operational activities of the national security services must be justified beyond doubt by the very broad mandate given by the state to limit fundamental rights, which in most democratic states of the world, including by constitutional requirements, means that they must be aimed at protecting a national value or a fundamental right, and thus a national interest. Most of the activities of the national security services are a set of preventive measures to protect and promote the state interest, which is embodied in activities relating to veiled or hidden threats and, with a broad power of restraint, are instruments of the state monopoly on the use of force.

The regulatory trends of this wide-ranging fundamental rights limitation mandate in the international context, based on the analysis of published cases related to national security services, are of a dilatory nature in cases of insufficient preventive protection and of a restrictive nature as a consequence of abuses. The regulatory issues of intelligence services are particularly noteworthy, since, in addition to their instruments for fundamental rights limitation, they also tend to infringe the sovereignty of other states by their activities, since they are deployed on their territory. An analysis of the typifiable tasks of the operational branches and their interrelationship shows that counter-intelligence is not exclusively domestic and intelligence is not exclusively foreign, so it is not appropriate to distinguish them according to their geographical orientation. Consequently, research on national security activities should take into account whether they are carried out abroad or at home.

In our country, the analysis of the tasks of the military counterintelligence and military intelligence branches shows that the interest of national defence - the *protection of territorial integrity and independence* - is similar to the interest of national security - the *protection of independence and the rule of law*. The protection and promotion of all these interests, even in times of peace and non-peace, requires the use of intelligence tools, justified on the intelligence side by the protection of information to be obtained from abroad and on the counter-intelligence side by the covert and covert nature of the activity aimed at obtaining military information. Research into the values to be protected and the interests at stake is essential in order to determine the extent to which the State is able and willing to intervene in the private sphere of citizens through its agencies authorised to use intelligence assets in order to safeguard them. An analysis of the tasks of the branches shows that they overlap and that the basis for their activities - the protection of national values and the promotion of national interests - is the same. Counter-intelligence is risk and crime focused, while intelligence focuses on obtaining the information needed to support the decision-making of governmental organisations, and their activities can be distinguished on the basis of these characteristics, as far as their content is known.

This national security activity is subject to the requirement, within a democratic framework, that restrictions on fundamental rights are only permissible for the purpose of ensuring the protection of another fundamental right or constitutional value, and must also meet the test for the protection of fundamental rights recognised by international law and applied by the Constitutional Court. I have analysed the division of fundamental rights according to the

possibility of their restriction, on the basis of which I have identified absolute (unlimited) fundamental rights, those which may be restricted during special legal regimes and those which may be restricted by law under regulated conditions, all of which are subject to the prohibition of restrictions on the essential content of human life and human dignity as a domestic and international requirement. In order to verify the latter, national and international practice also applies the test of the protection of fundamental rights, in relation to which I have shown that it is not practically applicable in everyday life, but that the law enforcer instead examines the application of the principles of national security in the professional context.

As far as military intelligence is concerned, the changed tasks of the Hungarian Defence Forces after the regime change, its international commitments and its alliance affiliation have increased the demand for information on crisis management and the changed modes of combat. Current policy influences both the direction and the budget of military intelligence, which can change rapidly, but are also in synergy with each other. Conversely, effective intelligence operations require forward planning, which is not well supported by the foregoing findings.

Information obtained through voluntary or mandatory reporting, open sources and reporting by the data controller are mostly methods of obtaining data with the knowledge of the data subject, so their fundamental rights are at least less restricted than the collection of information in secret, at least in so far as they are aware of it. Whereas in the case of voluntary or mandatory provision of data, you yourself answer the questions asked, in the case of the provision of data by the data controller, you are aware of the fact that the data have been provided. And in the case of open-source data collection, the data subject is aware of the disclosure of the data - he or she has made some of it public.

The voluntary or statutory provision of data is closely related to national security screening, the purpose of which is to examine the private and family life and financial situation of the person holding a position subject to national security screening and, within this context, to determine whether any risk factors can be identified which could be used to influence or attack the individual for unlawful purposes. The national security clearance shall examine the security risks affecting the performance of the services of the auditee free from such influence, primarily on the basis of the security questionnaire, supplemented by notifications of changes in the data contained in the items of the questionnaire during the period in which the person concerned has a valid national security clearance. The legislator considers that the conclusions drawn from the

verification of the data, facts and circumstances contained in the security questionnaire, taking into account the opinion of professional organisations, will determine whether the person concerned can carry out his or her duties without being influenced. The performance of a national security clearance reflects a snapshot of the individual and his/her circumstances, and therefore a risk-free opinion should be taken as a statement that, unless there is a change in the individual's circumstances, he/she can perform the job subject to a national security clearance without influence.

The majority of the reporting obligations linked to the institution of national security controls relate to changes in relations with foreigners and financial data, but also to information on new entrants to the household, criminal data and new employment.

Based on a comparison of the points of the obligation to notify set out in the Law on National Security Services and the Law on the Status of the Defence Forces, the obligation for professional and contractual defence personnel to notify the retention of service-related information and data related to ensuring availability, as well as circumstances affecting the essential nature of the service relationship, has been overlapped. The provisions of the National Security Act and the Law on the Status of the DPOs also provide for parallel reporting obligations. This duplication was considered to be unnecessary, since the Law on National Security Services provides for the obligation to conduct a national security check for all posts in all national security services, including the obligation to notify.

With regard to military personnel, I have revealed that, due to their special position in society, they perform their duties under special circumstances, as they are less free to exercise their fundamental rights than other members of society, in relation to which military intelligence may have marginal tasks in the context of military crime. The personal scope extends to individuals and legal persons for as long as there is a possibility of disclosure of the value to be protected, i.e. military secrets or non-public data, or for as long as the protection of that value can be achieved through national security activities in relation to that person. In the context of military intelligence, the characteristics of the military medium are dominant, as the legislative activity relating to these secret services rightly focuses on this area, since this is where the value and information they are protecting is located. Moreover, in the domestic context, military intelligence has additional tasks compared with civilian intelligence, since it is responsible for the detection of specific military offences until the investigation is ordered.

As the national security services can request data from any data management system, they have access to all registered personal data, special categories of data and criminal personal data of citizens, if necessary. All this is done without the knowledge of the data subject, whereby it is also regulated that the body providing the data must not inform the data subject or any other unauthorised person of the request or of the transfer. If the data necessary for the performance of the tasks of the national security services can be obtained by these other means of obtaining data, there is no need for the collection of confidential information because of the proportionality requirement.

The various means and methods of gathering secret information, whether or not subject to external authorisation, affect a wide range of fundamental rights, but are subject to different degrees of restriction. In addition to the privacy, privacy, family life, home, contact, reputation and confidentiality of personal data, which are at the core of the right to respect for human dignity, other measures, such as the right to use firearms, may also affect the right to personal liberty or the right to life, so that a strong fundamental right limitation can be identified in the context of national security activities.

The restrictions on the collection of secret information without an external authorisation affecting fundamental rights are summarised below in terms of their impact on individual fundamental rights:

	Private life	Private-secrecy	Family life	Home	Contact	Reputation	Personal data
Data request							X
Gathering information in cover	X	X	X	X	X		X
Human intelligence	X	X	X	X	X		X
Information systems							X
Trap						X	
Cover document							
Cover institution							
Watch	X	X			X		
Interception of a public conversation	X	X	X		X		X
Obtaining metadata	X	X	X		X		X
Non-penalty agreement	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Table 1 (own editing)

Fundamental rights restrictions on secret information gathering tools and methods not subject to external authorisation

The restrictions on the fundamental rights to the collection of classified information subject to external authorisation are summarised below:

	Private life	Private- secrecy	Family life	Home	Contact	Reputat ion	Personal data
Search of the dwelling	X	X	X	X	X		X
Home surveillance	X	X	X	X	X		X
Check of shipment	X	X	X	X	X		X
Interception of electronic communication	X	X	X	X	X		X
Access to data managed in an information system	X	X	X	X	X		X

Table 2 (own editing)

Fundamental rights restrictions on secret information gathering tools and methods subject to external authorisation

From the summary tables, I have concluded that, ultimately, all secret information gathering tools and methods can be directly or indirectly linked to a fundamental rights restriction, but not all of them actually achieve it. Secret information gathering subject to external authorisation, as can be inferred from the authorisation rules, imposes a profound restriction of rights, interfering with the very core of people's privacy, even if it is done passively, typically without the knowledge of the person concerned.

However, a ranking of the instruments and methods that do not require external authorisation can be drawn up on the basis of the number of fundamental rights affected, at least in terms of their direct impact, and this ranking shows the extent of the interference:

1. Gathering information under the guise of national security and establishing a covert relationship with a private individual (6),
2. Interception and recording of communications in a public place by technical means and obtaining metadata of communications transmitted over a communication system (5),
3. Requesting clarification and setting up information systems and using a non-harmful trap (1),
4. Use of a cover note and the establishment of a cover institution and an immunity agreement (0).




Figure 1 (own ed.) - Legal restrictions on the means and methods of collecting secret information

On this basis, the summary table can provide appropriate practical guidance for national security services to plan their operational activities in such a way that they can use the means and methods of intelligence gathering that are best suited to the operational situation and least restrictive of fundamental rights.

The fact that it involves several disciplines from several social sciences and can only be studied from the inside, the full depth of which cannot be published, is identified as a constraint on research into national security activities. The most important issues affecting national security today are social perceptions, generational issues, changing attitudes to security and psychological preparation, which can be studied, albeit to a limited extent.

Based on the analysis of the link between the field of national security research and military science, the information obtained by the military national security services can provide answers to the most important questions identified in the military science literature of the 20th and 21st centuries, and their coordinated action is therefore essential to ensure the progress of research. However, based on the national and international literature and the examples analysed, research on national security activities can never be complete, as the sources that can be included are limited due to the classification of data and the need to conceal it from the interested party.

From a law enforcement perspective, a comparison of national security services and law enforcement organisations shows that their tools and methods do not differ in content, but differ in their objectives. Among these organisations, the protection of law and order is a related area, where the dividing line can be drawn at the point where the crime is committed.

From a generational point of view, the older generations - Baby Boom and Generation X - have a crucial value in their relationship with the state and national security services, in that they are expected to guarantee security, while accepting and understanding the legal constraints that this may entail. These generations accept the way hierarchical organisations operate and submit to the instructions of elected and appointed officials. The younger generations - Y, Z and Alpha - have not developed a dependency on the state because of their different life experiences and are more critical of public administrations, which they express as the technical possibilities have increased. In the intergenerational context, dependency on technological tools can pose a security risk that is not only in the interest of the individual but also of society as a whole, especially if the individual concerned has information that could be detrimental to national interests if it were to be disclosed to unauthorised persons. The different workplace attitudes of different generations also require a change of approach from the national security services in terms of human resource development and the development of interfaces with society. These differences will also induce changes in the future in the application of intelligence assets, which will be subject to legislative requirements, and vice versa, i.e. changes in the legislative

environment will transform the application of intelligence assets. In this respect, the priority task for staff is to shape their personalities through education in a way that enhances security awareness and thus prevents risks from developing in a preventive way.

Scientific results

- I. I have shown that the threats to be averted by the national security services affect the social order and the security of the state and its people in such a profound way that the state is prepared to give them the authority to take greater risks and to intervene more in people's fundamental rights. I have also shown that the broad mandate of the NSAs to restrict fundamental rights is closely related to and part of the monopolization of violence that occurred with the emergence of statehood, since it inherently restricts fundamental rights in the same way as the traditional notion of violence.
- II. With regard to counterintelligence and intelligence, I analysed the typifiable tasks of the two operational branches through their relationship to each other, as a result of which I proved that counterintelligence does not exclusively carry out its activities domestically, while intelligence does not exclusively carry out its activities abroad, therefore it is not appropriate to distinguish them according to geographical orientation, and that there is an overlap between their tasks, since the basis of their activities - the protection of national values and the enforcement of national interests - is the same. With regard to military counterintelligence, I have demonstrated that it has no deeper fundamental rights-limiting powers than civilian counterintelligence, whereas with regard to intelligence, I have shown that rights-limiting activities need to be examined from the perspective of harming the interests of the target state.
- III. I have shown that the various means and methods of gathering secret information, whether or not subject to external authorisation, affect a wide range of fundamental rights, but also impose different restrictions on them. For both unauthorised and authorised means and methods, I have shown that they can be ranked in terms of the number of fundamental rights affected, in terms of their direct impact, and in terms of the degree of intrusion into the privacy of the individual. As a result of the research, I have prepared tables and diagrams showing the limitations of the fundamental rights of the means and methods of secret information gathering, which can be used in practice.

- IV. I have demonstrated that a change of approach is needed in the NSS in terms of human resource replenishment and the development of interfaces with society, due to the different attitudes towards the workplace and the differences in the relationship between the state and the NSS in relation to each generation of people. In the context of generational differences, I have further explored that they will also induce changes in the future in the use of intelligence assets and in the legislative environment.

Recommendations, practical applicability

As a result of the thesis, the table on the fundamental rights restrictions on the means and methods of collecting secret information, both with and without external authorisation, can serve as a practical guide for the personnel of the national security services to choose the least restrictive measure. In addition, I recommend that the legislator should keep the rules on the collection of classified information under constant review and adapt them to technological developments in order to maintain a balance between the protection of fundamental rights and the interests of national security.

The doctoral thesis examines the relationship between fundamental rights restrictions and the activities of intelligence services in a broad sense, and can therefore be used to underpin theoretical knowledge on intelligence gathering both at university level and in the internal training of national security services.

I would like to draw the attention of the national security services to the statement concerning the staff that a priority task for the future will be to shape the personality through education in a way that strengthens security awareness and thus prevents the development of risks in a preventive manner. Understanding and taking into account the different attitudes of the younger generations towards the state and national security is also essential to increase the social acceptance of the services.

I have also identified the impact of the talent spiral and the emergence and resolution of conflict situations arising from generational differences, which can arise both within the services and between senior intelligence staff and government management, as an area for further research.

List of publications

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Scientific and professional biography

Workplace Data

- 2022- Military National Security Service, Head of Department
- 2017-2022. Military National Security Service, Deputy Head of Department
- 2013-2017. Military National Security Service, Operations Officer
- 2007-2012. Hungarian Defence Forces, Training Officer (Company Commander)

Teaching Activity

- 2022- National University of Public Service, Institute of National Security, Department of Military National Security, Assistant Professor
- 2018-2022. National University of Public Service, Institute of National Security, Instructor

Educational qualifications

- 2020. National University of Public Service, Doctoral School of Military Science, complex exam
- 2016-2018. National University of Public Service, Institute of National Security, Certified National Security Expert
- 2003-2007. Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defence, Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Science, military leader (artillery)
- 1999-2003. Nagy László Gymnasium (Komló), high school graduation

Other Courses

- 2016. Counter Terrorism Centre of Excellence (Ankara), Counter Terrorism Course
- 2010-2012. Full range of NATO Counter IED courses
- 2010. NATO School (Oberammergau), Evaluation and Validation Course
- 2008. NATO School (Oberammergau), Academic Instructor Course

Language skills

English complex (C1)

Italian complex (B1)

Key Accolades

- 2018. Hungarian Silver Cross of Merit, military branch
- 2017. Officer Service Badge after 10 years
- 2012. Peace Service Medal and NATO Service Medal
- 2008. The Szentendre Soldier of the Year
- 2007. Saint Borbala Sword
- 2004. Service Mark for Flood Protection